050 Section (6.2(a)

Nuclear Issues in MBIK

US Paper distributed to NATO on 30 April 1973 outlined three reduction options, including Approach or Option III 36 US Pershing launchers, and three air squadrons containing a total of 54 US F-4 fighter/bombers along with related ground and air personnel for a Soviet Tank Army in East Germany.

The presentation in NATO of the US MBFR Approach Paper of 27 بالله was accompanied by two oral statements by Ambassador Rumsfeld, as follows:

"We should be prepared, if the negotiating situation calls for it, to bring US nuclear elements within the limits defined in Approach 3 of the US April 30 paper to bear in support of this first-phase reduction goal." (I.e., a Soviet Tank Army and 29,000 US soldiers).

"In the context of our reduction approach, we should be aware that the possible Eastern response to an Allied proposal for withdrawal of a Soviet tank army with its tanks would be that specific equipment be included in the Western withdrawal package. To be in a position to meet our negotiating goal, we would suggest that the Alliance agree in principle prior to negotiations that US nuclear elements within the limits included in Approach 3 of the April 30 paper could be brought to bear during the negotlations if the situation calls for It."

- Some Allies (especially the FRG) believe nuclear elements should be used to gain more of the Allied objectives than just the Tank Army, e.g., Eastern acceptance of the common celling.
- Eastern Proposal of 8 November proposes reduction of "ground and air forces and armaments, including nuclear weapons."
- FRG/UK interest in nuclear issues in MBFR is high. They have given us the attached list of questions, and a trilateral (US/FRG/UK) meeting to go over these questions is slated for week of 21 January.
- Talking Points
- Eventually we must decide whether and how we should plan to use the nuclear elements of our "Option III."
- But no decision should be made until the trilateral discussions are completed and we have consulted with NATO to get a feel for their reactions.
- Specific factors are: (1) What should be the criteria for our introducing nuclear elements into the negotiations; (2) Should we offer the entire package at once or should we take a piecemeal approach and offer only parts of the package at least initially; (3) For what should nuclear elements be used -- reduction of a Soviet Tank Army only, as envisaged in our position of 27 July, or also other elements of Allied proposal, e.g., Cactera commits set to common ceiling concept or specifics of creams charge and/or stable Examplement

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